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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RIO ALGOM CORPORATION, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
JIMCO LTD., HUMECA EXPLORATION ) 
COMPANY, JIM L. HUDSON, JUANITA ) 
J. MEYER AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ) 
ESTATE OF DANIEL H. MEYER, ) 
ELDON J. CARD, NORMA HUDSON, ) 
JEAN L. CARD, JUANITA J. MEYER, ) 
N. J. WHITE, AUDREY WHITE, WILMA ) 
WHITE, OTIS DIBLER, DOROTHY MAE ) 
DIBLER, GRACE DAVIS and MARLOWE C. ) 
SMITH, ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
No. 16032 
BRIEF OF JIMCO LTD., HUMECA EXPLORATION 
COMPANY, JIM L. HUDSON, JUANITA J. MEYER, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE 
OF DANIEL H. MEYER, ELDON J. CARD, NORMA HUDSON, 
AND JEAN L. CARD, ALL HEREIN REFERRED TO AS 
THE JIMCO RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
These respondents believe the following explanation, most 
of which is quoted from appellant's Complaint, is a more in-
formative and accurate statement of the nature of this case 
than the statement set forth in appellant's brief. 
In the appellant's own words, it instituted this inter-
pleader action "[b]ecause of the varying positions asserted • 
. . by each group of defendants plaintiff is unable to calcu-
late its royalty obligation. II The group subsequently 
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identified in this brief as the Audrey Respondents exercised 
an election to have their royalties computed on the basis of 
the fair market value of crude ore rather than the sales price 
of a yellowcake which is a 
Audrey Respondents' royalty 
more refined product. Since the 
is to be paid before any royalty 
is paid to the group identified in this brief as the Jimco Re-
spondents and since there is a maximum royalty for which the 
appellant is obligated, certain methods of determining a roy-
alty based upon the Audrey Respondents' election could dramat-
ically reduce a~: eve~ eliffiinate any royalty to the Jimco Re-
spondents. 
"as to the 
The arpellant sought from the court a declaration 
basis fJr calculating plaintiff's royalty obliga-
tions" as a result of the Audrey Respondents' election. Ap-
pellant asserted in its Complaint that it was "willing and 
able to make the royalty payments it is obligated" to make at 
"such times as a construal of the terms of both agreements 
provide plaintiff with a basis for calculating said royalty 
obligations." (R. 6). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After literally years of litigating the issue of what 
division of royalties should be made between the Jimco Respon-
dents and the Audrey Respondents, if and when the latter were 
allowed to compute their royal ties on the basis of the fair 
market value of crude ore, these respondents agreed upon a set-
tlement. This litigation was triggered, if not necessitated, 
-2-
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by the Audrey Respondents' "election" to cease having their 
royalty determined on the basis of the sales price of yellow-
cake (U308) which was the only uranium product actually sold 
from this property, and begin having their royalty determined 
on the basis of the market value of crude ore, something not 
sold from the property. Because of the difficulty, indeed the 
litigation, created by attempts to determine what this uranium 
would be worth if and when it were sold as crude ore rather 
than refined yellowcake, the Audrey Respondents agreed, as 
part of the settlement to return to a computation of their 
royalty on the basis of yellowcake actually sold. In return 
for this, the Jimco Respondents agreed to give the Audrey 
Respondents some of the Jimco royalty interest, which was also 
computed on the basis of yellowcake actually sold from the 
property. Since this was an interpleader action, and all de-
fendants had now settled their differences, it initially ap-
peared that this settlement would end the litigation based 
upon the Complaint. Litigation based upon Counterclaims, if 
not otherwise resolved, would remain. 
Shortly before the execution of the Settlement Stipula-
tion, the Jimco and Audrey Respondents were informed that the 
appellant (plaintiff) would oppose and attempt to block the 
settlement. Being thus advised, the respondents expressly 
made their settlement contingent upon the court determining 
that by settling pursuant to the agreed upon terms they would 
-3-
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not give rise to any cause of action in favor of the appel-
lant. The appellant, making good its threat, moved to amend 
its Complaint away 
of action which it 
from interpleader to assert various causes 
claimed arose by reason of the proposed 
settlement. At about the same time, the respondents moved the 
court to approve the Settlement Stipulation and declare, as a 
matter of lavl, that no cause of action in favor of appellant 
arose by reason of the agreement. Numerous briefs were filed 
and oral argt.:r:er.t was extensively presented on more than one 
occasion. 
This appeal 
Conder, of the 
is from the Order entered by Judge Dean E. 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, ruling that appellant has no right based upon either 
the Audrey Lease or the Jimco Agreement, or based upon any 
other theory of law or equity, to challenge or otherwise bar 
the effectuation or implementation of the Settlement Stipula-
tion executed by the Audrey Respondents and the Jimco Respon-
dents; that such settlement is not in violation of any duty 
owed to appellant by any of the respondents; and that effec-
tuation and implementation of the Settlement Stipulation ef-
fectively and totally dismisses the Audrey Respondents from 
this litigation; and dismissing the amended complaint filed by 
appellant after the execution of the Settlement Stipulation. 
-4-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Jimco Respondents seek to have the Order of the dis-
trict court affirmed in its entirety. 
IDENTITIES OF THE PARTIES 
1. Rio Algom Corporation 
Rio Algom Corporation (hereinafter ~appellant~ or ~Rio~), 
plaintiff-appellant in this matter, is a Delaware corporation, 
incorporated on February 9, 1968, and qualified to do business 
in Utah as of sometime in December, 1968. It was forned for 
the specific purpose of developing certain properties under 
assignments from the Jimco Respondents of their leasehold 
rights. ( R. 1639). Rio is a wholly owned subsidiary of Atlas 
Alloys, Inc. which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Rio Algom 
Limited, of Toronto, Ontario, Canada)_/ (R. 1638). The 
records of the Utah Secretary of State disclose that at the 
time Rio qualified to do business in Utah, all of its officers 
and directors (except two attorneys who live in New York City) 
were officers and/or directors or employees, of Rio Algom 
Limited. The address of each of the officers and directors of 
the plaintiff (with the two previously noted exceptions) was 
1 I Rio is not the corporation that executed the Amended 
Audrey Lease and the Rio-Jimco Option Agreement. Those docu-
ments were executed by Rio Algom Corporation, an Ohio corpo-
ration, and also a wholly owned subsidiary of Rio Algom Limi-
ted. The parent corporation subsequently changed the name of 
the Ohio corporation and conferred the name Rio Algom Corpora-
tion upon the appellant. 
-5-
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given as "c/o Rio Algom Mines Lirni ted, 120 Adelaide St., W., 
Toronto, Canada, Ontario." 
For many years George R. Albino, president 
operating officer of the parent corporation, 
and 
Rio 
chief 
Algom 
Limited, was also the appellant's president. r~r. Albino, 
formerly a citizen of the United States, is now a citizen of 
Canada. (R. 1638). 
2. Audrey Lessors -- Audrey Respondents 
In 1964, tr.e Audrey Lessors consisted of the last seven 
persons named as defendants in the Complaint, or their prede-
cessors in interest. On February 28, 1964, those Audrey Les-
sors leased the Audrey claims to a predecessor of the Jirnco 
Respondents. ( R. 13). Sometime in January, 1968 Rio pur-
chased 25% of the Audrey Lessors' interest. The term "Audrey 
Respondents" is used to identify those Audrey Lessors who own 
the remaining three quarters of the Audrey interest. The term 
"Audrey Respondents" does not include Rio. 
3. Jimco, Ltd. -- Jimco Respondents 
Jirnco, Ltd. is a limited partnership with more than 100 
limited partners. The lirni ted partners are the persons who 
contributed money to finance drilling of the Audrey claims by 
Jim L. Hudson, Daniel H. Meyer and Eldon J. Card (the General 
Partners of J imco, Ltd.). 
est was acquired by his 
certain reserved royalty 
Upon his death, Mr. Meyer's inter-
wife, Juanita J. Meyer. Except for 
interests, all of the leasehold 
-6-
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interests in the Audrey claims held by the aforementioned con-
tributors and all other predecessors of Jimco, Ltd., were as-
signed to that limited partnership. The partnership later 
assigned them to Rio, subject to the terms and provisions of a 
written agreement known as the Rio - Jimco Option Agreement. 
The term "Jimco Respondents" is used in this brief to 
identify the owners of all Jimco interests except those held 
by Rio. For convenience, and except where otherwise indi-
cated, the term "Jimco Respondents" includes all of Jimco's 
predecessors in interest. 
PREFACE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Jimco Respondents cannot accept Rio's "Statement of 
Facts" for the reason that it is argumentative, inaccurate, 
and misleading. 
some: 
The following items are particularly trouble-
1. Rio ignores the "Original" Audrey Lease, dated 
February 28, 1964. (R. 9, 13, 16). 
2. Rio presents an abbreviated and misleading summary 
under the heading "Relationship of the Parties." 
3. Under the heading "Pertinent Royalty Provisions", Rio 
does not quote from the basic royalties in the Amended Audrey 
Lease and inaccurately describes the effect of those royal-
ties. From Rio's discussion one would not learn that they 
provide: (a) in the event crude ore is sold, the lessor roy-
alty will be "eight per cent (8%) of the 'Sales Price' 
-7-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
received by Lessee from the sale of all ores mined • ." and 
(b), in the event Lessee produces from the ore uranium corn-
pounds, the Lessor royalty will be "four per cent ( 4%) of the 
'Gross Value' of such compounds . II (Paragraphs 3.1(a) and 
3.1(b) of the Amended Audrey Lease). 
~. Under the same heading Rio makes the following self-
serving and to some extent misleading statements: 
"[ T]he Audreys and Rio reserved the right in 
the Amended Audrey Lease to have those royal ties 
based on eight percent of the fair market value of 
crude ore produced from the claims, in lieu of the 
four percer:t royalty " (Brief of App. at 4) 
(emphasis sup~lied). 
Since only the Audrey Respondents had the power to exercise 
the option, the right was only "reserved" for them, even 
though the exercise of their right would affect Rio. 
"Rio delefated the election decision to the Audreys 
. . . . Brief of App. at 5) (emphasis supplied). 
In fact, Rio bargained this away. 
"In June, 1968, Rio and the Audreys entered into an 
Agreement leasing these claims to the Jimcos." 
(Brief of App. at 3) (emphasis supplied). 
Rio did not become a lessor until January of 1968 (about 6 
months before the Amended Audrey Lease was executed), when it 
purchased a 25% lessor interest. About 18 months before Rio 
purchased a 25% lessor interest, it had acquired a valid op-
tion to obtain an assignment from the Jimco Respondents of the 
leasehold interest under the "Original" Audrey Lease and any 
amendment of that lease. While Rio was, in fact, the owner of 
-8-
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a lessor interest when it executed the Amended Lease, it had, 
prior to that time, become the real lessee by virtue of the 
fact that it had exercised the option to acquire the lessee 
interest, a fact which was acknowledged in several provisions 
of the Amended Audrey Lease. It is also evident that the 
Amendment of the "Original" Audrey Lease was chiefly for the 
benefit of Rio in its role as lessee. 
5. Rio treats "Royalties Under the Rio-Jimco Option 
Agreement" with a light brush and in a hypothetical manner and 
then draws unjustified conclusions therefrom. (Brief of App. 
at 4). 
6. Rio's "factual" discussion of the Settlement Stipula-
tion (Brief of App. at 10-13) includes argument, contentions, 
and conclusions, one of which is the following: 
Rio contends that this too directly violates 
its rights under the Audrey Lease because under that 
lease Rio always received twenty-five percent of the 
'Audrey royalty pie', whereas under the new arrange-
ment Rio will receive one percent of yellowcake 
while Audrey will receive 5.5 percent of yellowcake 
--effectively reducing Rio's percentage of the so-
called royalty pie from twenty-five percent to 15.3 
percent. (Brief of App. at 11-12). 
This contention will be more extensively dealt with in the 
"Preface to Argument" section of this brief. However, since 
this contention is included in Rio's "Statement of Facts", one 
observation is appropriate at this time. If the Jimco Respon-
dents take 2.5% from their own "royalty pie" and give it to 
the Audrey Respondents in order to settle differences between 
-9-
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them, the Audrey "pie" remains completely unchanged. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The "Original" Audrey Lease 
In February of 1964, the Audrey Respondents leased the 
2/ Audrey claims to a predecessor of the Jimco Respondents.- At 
that time, there had been no discovery on the unpatented 
claims. The lease provided for a lessor's royalty of "[e]ight 
per cent ( 8%) of the gross milling and . smelting receipts 
for the ore less the cost of hauling, transportation, milling 
and processing." It also provided that the lessee should 
"drill a test hole to the Shinarump formation to ascer-
tain the uranium values." In compliance with this require-
ment, the Jimco Respondents raised approximately $190,000.00 
from persons who later became limited partners in Jimco, Ltd. 
and drilled 6 holes on the Audrey claims, some of which were 
drilled to a depth of 2500 feet. Uranium mineralization was 
discovered by the Jimco Respondents, and they started negoti-
ations with a number of companies for development of the prop-
erties. Such negotiations ultimately were commenced with rep-
resentatives of Rio Algom Limited, of which the Appellant Rio 
21 
The lessee of the "Original" lease was a corporation, 
Pacific-Associated Oil and Gas Company, all the stock of which 
was owned by Daniel H. Meyer. All rights held by said corpo-
ration were acquired by the Jimco Respondents. 
-10-
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is a wholly owned subsidiary. 
2. Letter Agreements of July 14 and November 30, 1966 
After many months of negotiations, two letter agreements 
were executed by representatives of wholly owned subsidiaries 
of Rio Algom Limited and the Jimco Respondents by the terms of 
which exploration and purchase options were granted to the Rio 
Algoms.l/ After completion of a drilling program, but before 
execution of the Amended Audrey Lease, the purchase option was 
exercised by one of the Rio Algoms and Rio became entitled to 
an assignment from the Jimco Respondents of their leasehold 
rights, subject to the terms and conditions of the Rio-Jimco 
Option Agreement. (R. 11, 78, 79). 
3. The Amended Audrey Lease 
The basic royal ties of the Amended Audrey Lease are set 
out in Paragraph 3.1, which provides as follows: 
(a) In the event Lessee shall mine or extract 
ore from the Audrey Group which is sold in its raw 
or crude form Lessee shall pay Lessors a royalty 
equal to eight per cent (8%) of the 'Sales Price' 
(as hereinafter defined) received by Lessee from the 
sale of all ores mined, produced and sold in the 
crude form from the Audrey Group. 
(b) 
ore from 
sale or 
minerals 
In the event Lessee shall mine or extract 
the Audrey Group and recover therefrom for 
use in commercial quantities any of the 
contained in such ore, and if the minerals 
Because a number of wholly owned subsidiaries of Rio 
Algom Limited were in vo 1 ved at one stage or another of the 
negotiations, and in the actual execution of documents, this 
brief will utilize the term "Rio Algorns" to mean Rio Algorn 
Limited or one or another of its subsidiaries or representa-
tives. 
-11-
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so recovered shall be anv uranium compound, Lessee 
shall pay to Lessors a roy"al ty of four per cent ( 4%) 
of the 'Gross Value' of such compounds (as herein-
after defined). . . (R. 81). 
In short, the two royalties created by the Amended Audrey 
Lease were 8% of the amount received if crude ore should be 
sold, or 4% of the proceeds from the sale of yellowcake if 
yellowcake should be sold. 
The language in Paragraph 3.2 provides as follows: 
Irrespective of the provisions set forth in para-
graph 3.1 above, Lessors shall have the election and 
option to have royalties due them under the terms of 
this Lease calculated and paid upon the basis of 
eight percent (5%) of t!'le fair market value at the 
mine portal of crude ore mined and produced from the 
Audrey Group. 
As is readily apparent from the language employed, Para-
graph 3.2 did not create an additional, or new, royalty, but 
merely provided that the Audrey Lessors should have the elec-
tion and option to have royalties "due the~ under the terms of 
this Lease" calculated and paid upon the basis of the fair 
market value of crude ore mined from the property. ( R. 83) 
(emphasis supplied). 
One more provision of the Amended Audrey Lease is cri ti-
cal to the issue before this Court. That provision is Para-
graph 21.3, which provides as follows: 
Rio Algom Corporation shall, by reason of its in-
terest in this Lease as described in Section II 
hereof, be excluded from ~ vote or decision of the 
Lessors relating to royalties and requiring unani-
mity of the Lessors, as provided for in Section 3.2 
hereof. The unanimous vote or decision of the re-
maining Lessors other than Rio Algom Corporation 
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shall constitute unanimity for the purpose of the 
said Section 3.2. 
The appellant, Rio, expressly agreed to be excluded from any 
"vote or decision" as to the exercise of any option regarding 
royalty payments. 
PREFACE TO ARGUMENT 
Rio has chosen to present its attack upon the trial 
court's 
4/ 
approval- of the Jimco-Audrey Settlement Stipulation 
through the use of five points. For the sake of convenience, 
these respondents will respond in turn to each of Rio's points 
in the "Argument" section of this brief.~/ 
4/ Of course, judicial approval of settlements of this 
type is not required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Cf. Rule 23 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If it 
were not for the fact that judicial approval was made a condi-
tion precedent to the settlement in question, it would stand 
on its own footing and there would be no need to pass upon the 
trial court's action. Cf. Ham v. Marshall, 46 Ill. App. 2d 
92, 196 N.E.2d 377 (1964!. Judicial approval of the settle-
ment was sought because the Jimco Respondents and the Audrey 
Respondents were informed that Rio would challenge any settle-
ment between them. 
It is the rather unique combination of events 
described in the preceding note which prompts Rio to "suggest" 
in its "Preface to Argument" that the Court draw an analogy to 
the standards governine: review of a decision granting a Rule 
12(b) (6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted in considering its various points 
and, accordingly, determine "not whether Audrey and Jirnco have 
violated duties to Rio but whether ••• it has been demon-
strated to a certainty that Rio could not prove a violation of 
duties. • • " (Brief of App. at 16-17). Whatever the merits 
of this argument may be in the procedural context of this 
case, to employ the suggested analogy before determining what, 
if any, duties were owed to Rio is to put the cart before the 
horse. Because the Jimco Respondents and the Audrey 
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It must be constantly borne in mind, however, that this 
Court is confronted with a single issue; can Rio challenge the 
action taken by the Audrey Respondents in exercising the 
"election and option" granted exclusively to them in the 
Amended Audrey Lease (Paragraphs 3.2 and 21.3)? Said lease 
expressly •excluded" Rio from participating in the election 
and option because of a conflict of interest which arises out 
of the fact that Rio is the lessee of the properties and also 
holds a 25% interest in the lessor royalty. The following 
quotation contains language from the Amended Audrey Lease 
which notes this conflict and sets forth the royalty election 
scheme whereby Rio is excluded from any participation in the 
Audrey Lessors' decision: 
3.2 Irrespective of the provisions set forth in 
paragraph 3.1 above, Lessors shall have the election 
and option to have royalties due them under the 
terms of this Lease calculated and paid upon the 
basis of eight per cent (8%) of the fair market 
value at the mine portal of crude ore mined and 
produced from the Audrey Group. In order to 
exercise such election Lessors must unanimously 
agree and notify Lessee in writing at least ninety 
Respondents did not, as a matter of law, violate any right of 
or duty to Rio in entering the settlement in question, as is 
demonstrated in the dj scussion that follows, the analogy is 
beside the point. 
The basis for the further suggestion that the procedures 
employed by the trial court somehow violate due process of law 
is nothing more than rhetoric from a litigant dissatisfied 
with the result. Vlhether, as a matter of law, the Jimco and 
Audrey Respondents could settle upon the terms of the Settle-
ment Stipulation without violating any duty owed Rio was fully 
litigated in the court below. 
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(90) days prior to the commencement of any calendar 
year of their election to require royalties to be 
calculated and paid in such manner. After having 
given such notice, the election so made shall remain 
in force and effect for the next ensuing calendar 
year, and from year to year thereafter, unless the 
Lessors should unanimously agree and notify Lessee 
in writing of their revocation of said election, 
which notification must be given at least ninety 
(90) days prior to the commencement of a calendar 
year and shall become effective at the commencement 
of, and remain in effect during the ensuing calendar 
year, and from year to year thereafter, unless 
another such notification of election is given at 
the time and in the manner as specified above. 
(Paragraph 3.2) (emphasis supplied). 
Paragraph 21.3 provides: 
21.3 Rio Algom Corporation shall, by reason of its 
interest in this Lease as described in Section II 
hereof, be excluded from ~ vote or decision of the 
Lessors relating to royalties and requiring unani-
mity of the Lessors, as provided for in Section 3.2 
hereof. The unanimous vote or decision of the re-
maining Lessors other than Rio Algom Corporation 
shall constitute unanimity for the purpose of the 
said Section 3.2. (Emphasis supplied). 
Paragraph 2.3 of the Amended Lease in pertinent part provides: 
2.3 The parties hereto recognize and acknowledge 
that Rio Algom Corporation, in a capacity distinct 
from its capacity as one of the Lessors herein, on 
June 18, 1968, held a valid and subsisting option to 
acquire an assignment of the leasehold interest of 
Lessee in the Original Lease and the mining claims 
covered thereby, subject to the terms and conditions 
of the Option Agreement. Rio Algom Corporation duly 
exercised the option as of June 18, 1968 ••. 
Paragraph 21.2 of the Amended Lease further provides in perti-
nent part that: 
21.2 At the 
Lease, one of 
poration, has 
interest as one 
in the recitals 
time of execution of this Amended 
the Lessors, namely Rio Algom Cor-
an interest in addition to its 
of the Lessors herein, as described 
in Section II hereof ••• 
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The foregoing provisions direct attention to the inherent 
conflict of interest position in ~o~hich Rio by contract has 
voluntarily placed itself. They expressly and unconditionally 
deny Rio any right to participate in the process of deter-
mining how royalties shall be calculated -- whether on the 
basis of a percentage of receipts from the sale of "yellow-
cake" (u
3
o8 ), or on the basis of a percentage of the fair 
market value of crude ore at the mine portal. 
In the Settlement Stipulation, the Audrey Respondents 
agreed to "take in full satisfaction of all royalty obliga-
tions owed to them by both the Jimco Defendents and Rio Algom 
Corporation under both the Audrey Lease and the Jimco 
Agreement, 5.5% of the total proceeds from the sale of yellow-
cake by Rio to Duke Power Company or any other purchaser." 
(R. 2242). The 5. 5% figure was arrived at by taking 3% ( 75% 
of the Audrey royalty of 4%, if calculated on the basis of re-
ceipts from the sale of yellowcake,) and adding 2.5% which the 
Jimco Respondents agreed to give the Audrey Respondents out of 
the Jimco royalties for settling all differences between them. 
The Settlement Stipulation also provided: 
2. For the calendar year 1979, and all years 
thereafter, the Audrey Defendants hereby waive their 
right to the election of royalty payments based upon 
market value of crude ore as provided in paragraph 
3.2 of the Audrey Lease, and agree to timely revoke 
their previous election under paragraph 3.2. Timely 
notice of the revocation of said election will be 
provided by the Audrey Defendants to Rio. (R. 2243). 
The trial court approved the Settlement Stipulation, and in 
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its order ruled, in part: 
2. The Court hereby rules that Rio has no 
standing under either the Audrey Lease or the Jimco 
Agreement, or any other theory of law or equity, to 
challenge or otherwise bar the effectuation and im-
plementation of that certain Settlement Stipulation 
between the Audrey Defendants and the Jimco Defen-
dants and that such Settlement Stipulation is not in 
violation of any duty owed to Rio by any of the de-
fendants. (R. 1983). 
The lower court also, consistent with its approval of the 
settlement, dismissed an amended complaint filed by Rio. 
One of the argurr;ents made by Rio, at pages 11-12 of its 
"Statement of Facts", against the Settlement Stipulation is as 
follows: 
Rio contends that this too directly violates 
its rights under the Audrey Lease because under that 
lease Rio always received twenty-five percent of the 
'Audrey royalty pie 1 , whereas under the new arrange-
ment Rio will receive one percent of yellowcake 
while Audrey will receive 5.5 percent of yellowcake 
-- effectively reducing Rio 1 s percentage of the so-
called royalty pie from twenty-five percent to 15.3 
percent. 
A sirnilar argument was made by counsel for Rio before the 
trial court. (R. 2190). 
The argument put forth by Rio is fallacious. The Jimco 
Respondents have chosen to take 2.5% out if their "pie" and 
give that to the Audrey Respondents. The "Audrey royalty pie" 
and the percentage ownerships remain completely unchanged. 
Rio still has its 25% of the "Audrey royalty pie", and the 
Audrey Respondents have the other 75% of that "pie." The only 
change is that the Jimco Respondents have given part of their 
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"pie" to the Audrey Respondents, who now have parts from two 
different "pies". 
Certainly, as Rio claims, if the Jimco Respondents give 
part of their royalty to the Audrey Respondents, the Audrey 
Respondents will now receive a greater royalty without Rio 
realizing any incr·ease in its royalty. However, the Jimco 
Respondents now will receive a lesser royalty without Rio 
experiencing any decrease. Rio only plays one side of the 
numbers game when it laments that its share, when compared to 
the increased Audrey Respondents' share, produces a ratio 
less favorable to Rio than before the settlement between 
Audrey and Jimco. However, when Rio's share is compared to 
the now decreased share of the Jimco Respondents, the ratio is 
more favorable to Rio than before the settlement. The Jimco 
Respondents gave part of their share to the Audrey Respondents 
and nobody has given away any part of Rio's "pie". Rio's 
royalty simply hasn't been changed. 
Rio has presented different faces in this matter. When 
it initiated this case, it characterized itself as just a 
"stakeholder" in the rnatter of calculating and paying royal-
ties. It alleged in the Complaint, and still alleges whenever 
it tenders royalty payments to the trial court, that it cannot 
determine what its royalty obligations are and prays for de-
claratory relief. During the course of the proceeding in the 
trial court, however, Rio changed its position and argued for 
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an interpretation of the Amended Lease which, as illustrated 
by its "hypothetical" on page 8 of its brief, would completely 
wipe out the Jimco Respondents' royalties. 
As lessee, Rio has had the exclusive right to mine, mill, 
and sell products of the mine. It has entered into a number 
of contracts with Duke Power Company under which it has sold, 
or committed by options, the entire output of the property, 
and granted to Duke certain rights to use the mill. It has 
sold yellowcake produced from ore taken out of the Lisbon mine 
at prices it considered fair and reasonable. Its interest as 
the lessee whose self-interest would favor small, or no 
royalties -- conflicts with its interest as the owner of a 25% 
lessor royalty which, of course, would involve a self-
interest favoring high royalties. 
Finally, Rio now seeks to exercise a veto power over an 
exclusive right expressly given by a written contract to the 
Audrey Respondents by asserting that the Audrey Respondents 
should be required to exercise the royalty election for the 
benefit of Rio. To so hold would be to find that the language 
of the lease which gives the Audrey Respondents the exclusive 
right to exercise the option does not mean what it states. 
Rio filed this action claiming that the Court should 
determine what royalty should be paid the Jirnco Respondents 
and the Audrey Respondents. These parties have now settled 
their differences and agreed to a particular division of the 
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royalties based upon a simple method of computation. They 
have adjusted, as they deemed to be in their best interests, 
the risks of this litigation as between themselves. The con-
sideration received by the Audrey Respondents for their com-
mitment to waive their election inures solely to their bene-
fit. The consideration of the settlement agreement is a pay-
ment of money to be computed by reference to royalty percent-
age. Rio should not be permitted to block this agreement 
simply because it also wants something (a larger slice of the 
"pie"). 
Still further reason to deny Rio the power to which it 
asserts it is entitled, lies in the fact that the asserted 
power is a power to interfere in a legitimate settlement of 
conflicting claims. Such cannot be countenanced, especially 
in view of Rio's status as plaintiff in this interpleader 
action. 
The voluntary settlement of disputes is undeniably 
favored by the law. See generally, 15A Am. Jur. 2d Compromise 
and Settlement § 5 ( 1976). It is axiomatic that some, though 
less than all, of the parties to a lawsuit may agree to the 
settlement of disputes as between themselves. In this regard, 
the following observation, though made in a somewhat different 
context, is particularly pertinent: 
Adults having an interest in litigation have a per-
sonal right to negotiate and settle. Persons whose 
rights are affected by litigation, present or pros-
pective, have a right to buy their peace by payment 
-20-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for a covenant or a release. Others having a 
similar interest cannot prevent a settlement by 
those willing to agree to it. This is so commonly 
done that it is amazing to find competent attorneys 
having any doubt about it. And it is so rare that a 
settlement is attacked, there is a paucity of 
authority on it. 
Ham v. Marshall, 46 Ill. App. 2d 92, 196 N.E.2d 377, 379 
(1964) (emphasis supplied). 
In sum, to grant Rio the relief which it seeks is to 
grant it a role in decisions relating to royalties which is 
expressly denied to it by the terms of the Audrey Lease and is 
to impose upon the Audrey Respondents and the Jimco Respon-
dents burdens which they did not and should not be required to 
assume. The trial court acted in accordance with the terms of 
the Audrey Lease and in furtherance of the well-settled policy 
of the law in approving the Jimco-Audrey Settlement Stipula-
tion. Its decision should be affirmed. The following section 
of this brief considers in order each of the points asserted 
by the appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE JIMCO-AUDREY SETTLEMENT STIPULATION DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE AN AMENDMENT OR MODIFICATION OF ANY 
AGREEMENT TO WHICH RIO IS A PARTY BUT, RATHER, 
IS A TOTALLY SEPARATE AGREEMENT AND MUST BE 
JUDGED AS SUCH. 
Rio devotes a substantial portion of its brief to the 
argument that the Jimco-Audrey Settlement Stipulation consti-
tutes an amendment or modification of the Audrey Lease without 
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its consent and, therefore, similarly amends or modifies the 
Jimco Agreement. (Brief of App. at 17-22). Such, it con-
tends, violates the fundamental principle of contract law that 
an agreement cannot be amended or modified without the consent 
of all of the parties thereto. The Jimco Respondents do not, 
of course, deny that an agreement cannot be so amended or 
modified. They fail to see, however, how Rio could so miscon-
strue the Settle~ent Stipulation. 
The Jimco-Audrey Settlement Stipulation is simply a con-
tract between tne Jimco Respondents and the Audrey Respon-
dents. 15A Am. Jur. 2d Compromise and Settlement § 7 ( 1976). 
It does not purport to be, was not intended to be, and is not 
an amendment or modification of any agreement to which Rio is 
a party. Indeed, the agreement expressly provides that is 
entered: 
without admission or determination of what is or has 
been the fair market value of crude ore, or whether 
there is or has been a market value for crude ore, 
or an other issue in this liti ation. 
Emphasis supplied 
The agreement provides for the retroactive revocation, as to 
only the Audrey Respondents, of their previous election to 
receive royalty payments based upon the market value of crude 
ore as provided in Paragraph 3. 2 of the Amended Audrey Lease. 
It provides for the payment to the Audrey Respondents of the 
3% royalty on the proceeds from the sale of yellowcake to 
which they are entitled pursuant to the terms of the lease and 
-22-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for the payment of an additional 2.5% royalty, determined on 
the same basis, from the amount to which the Jimco Respondents 
are entitled under the Jimco Agreement. Nothing therein 
affects the election as it bears upon the dispute between Rio 
and the Jim co Respondents with regard to the basis for the 
calculation of royalty payments for the years prior to the 
commencement of the 1979 calendar year. 
From calendar year 1979 forward, 
merely 
provided 
waiver 
agree 
for 
is the 
to waive their right to 
in Paragraph 3.2 of the 
result of an agreement 
the Audrey Respondents 
exercise the election 
Audrey Lease. That 
separate and distinct 
from the Audrey Lease and the Jimco Agreement. It must be 
judged as such. It is a misconception to argue that it is 
invalid as an amendment or modification of either the Audrey 
Lease or the Jimco Agreement without Rio's consent. If the 
Audrey Respondents were to attempt to again invoke the elec-
tion provided for in Paragraph 3. 2 of the Audrey Lease, the 
Jirnco Respondents would have a cause of action not on the 
Audrey Lease, nor on the Jimco Agreement 
Settlement Stipulation. 
but, rather, on the 
Judged as a separate and 
Audrey Settlement Stipulation 
distinct agreement, 
offends nothing in 
the Jimco-
the Audrey 
Lease and, therefore, can offend nothing in the Jimco Agree-
ment by reason of the provision of that Agreement which is 
relied upon by Rio as incorporating the terms and provisions 
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of the Lease. Ooviously, the provision in Paragraph 21.3 of 
the Audrey Lease that the election provided for in Paragraph 
3.2 thereof be made exclusively by the Audrey Respondents was 
inserted for the benefit of the Audrey Respondents. It is 
well-settled as a general principle that "[a] party may . 
.waive a provision in a contract. . which was inserted for 
his benefit." Oleg Cassini, Inc. v. Couture Coordinates 
lrl£.' 297 F. Supp. 821, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). No reason ap-
pears to deny a party the right to contract to do so. 
When parties to an agreement confer upon one party a 
right which may be exercised exclusively by that party as that 
party sees fit, the exercise of that right does not constitute 
the amendment or modification of the agreement. !Jo different 
result can be found where the party upon whom the right was 
conferred bargains with respect the exercise of its exclusive 
option. Assignments of rents, royalties or other benefits are 
common examples. 
Rio cannot claim that it is prejudiced by the Jimco-
Audrey Settlement Stipulation because it never had a right 
that could be impaired by that agreement. The Amended Lease 
denies Rio the right it now seeks to assert. Nor can Rio com-
plain that the Audrey Respondents were the exclusive recipi-
ents of the settlement consideration. The consideration 
received by the Audrey Respondents for ending this action with 
respect to themselves is for the exercise of rights belonging 
exclusively to them. 
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Indeed, it is Rio who seeks to amend or modify the Audrey 
Lease without the consent of the Audrey Respondents. The 
aforementioned lease expressly states that Rio shall have no 
vote or decision as to the exercise of the very election at 
issue before this Court. The Audrey Respondents, by the terms 
of that lease, have the exclusive right to elect how the roy-
alties provided for in that lease are to be computed. Rio by 
the terms of that agreement has no say whatsoever. Rio now 
asks this Court to grant it a veto power over the election 
Hr.ich the Audrey Respondents have made. Rio seeks a power 
Hhich the written agreement expressly denied to it for very 
good reasons. If this Court were to hold that the Audrey 
Respondents cannot exercise the Paragraph 3.2 election unless 
their action meets with the approval of Rio, then this Court 
Hould be rewriting the Audrey Lease to allow Rio a "vote or 
decision" in the election of computation methods. Rio seeks 
to regain by this appeal what it freely bargained away in the 
Audrey Lease. 
II. 
RIO, AS A PARTY TO THE AUDREY LEASE, HAS NO 
CLAIM AS A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY THEREUNDER 
AND, IN ANY EVENT, WOULD HAVE NO GREATER RIGHTS 
THEREUNDER AS SUCH THAN IT HAS AN AN ACTUAL PARTY. 
Not content to argue merely that the Jimco-Audrey Settle-
ment Stipulation is invalid as an attempt to amend or modify 
the Audrey Lease without its consent, Rio advances the further 
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argument that the Settlement Stipulation is invalid because 
Rio is also an "intended beneficiary" of the Lease. (Brief of 
App. at 22-23). The argument is not supported by authority. 
The cases cited by Rio deal with the question of whether 
one not a party to an agreement can nonetheless enforce rights 
under it as a third party beneficiary. (See, Manning v. 
1/iscombe, 498 F.2d 1311 (1Oth Cir. 1974); Hammill v. Maryland 
Cas. Co., 209 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1954); Montgomery v. Rief, 
15 Utah 495, 50 P.623 ( 1897)). These cases recognize that a 
third 2arty may do so if he was intended to be benefited by 
the performance of the contract. See also Clark v. American 
Standard, Inc., __ P.2d __ (Utah, August 8, 1978). Insofar 
as the Jimco Respondents have been able to ascertain, that is 
the only context in which the doctrine of intended beneficiar-
ies has been employed. See, Clark v. American Standard, Inc., 
supra; V!alker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp., 9 Utah 
2d 21, 341 P.2d 944 (1959); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Stewart, 4 Utah 228, 291 P.2d 890 (1955). 
Rio is a ~ to the Audrey Lease. 
no claim as a third party beneficiary. 
It, therefore, has 
Moreover, as pre-
viously noted, Rio was not intended to benefit from the Audrey 
Respondents' exercise of their exclusive right to determine 
the basis upon which royalties under the Audrey Lease were to 
be computed. 
Just as important, even as a third party beneficiary, Rio 
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can have no greater rights under the Audrey Lease than it has 
as an actual party. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 
supra. Rio's intended third party beneficiary argument gains 
it nothing. 
III. 
THE AUDREY RESPONDENTS OWED NO FIDUCIARY DUTY TO 
RIO WITH REGARD TO THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS 
UNDER PARAGRAPHS 3.2 AND 21.3 OF THE AUDREY LEASE 
AND, THEREFORE, BREACHED NO SUCH DUTY IN ENTERING 
INTO THE JIMCO-AUDREY SETTLEMENT STIPULATION. 
Rio at last gets to issue of the validity of the Jimco-
Audrey Settlement Stipulation as an agreement separate and 
distinct from the Audrey Lease and the Jimco Agreement with 
its argument that the Audrey Respondents, in entering into the 
agreement, breached fiduciary duties owed to Rio. (Brief of 
App. at 23-26). Such duties, it argues, exist both by reason 
of the status of Rio and the Audrey Respondents as cotenants 
of the subject uranium claims and by reason of the Audrey 
Lease inasmuch as it vests the Audrey Respondents with certain 
exclusive rights, the exercise of which have some consequence 
to Rio. In entering into the Jimco-Audrey Settlement Stipula-
tion, Rio claims the Audrey Respondents breached those duties 
in that they deprived Rio of participation in royalties com-
puted in accordance with a previous election made by the 
Audrey Respondents. 
That cotenants, as such, owe certain duties to each other 
cannot be doubted. For example, a cotenant, as such, lacks 
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authority to dispose of the common property and must account 
to his other cotenants if he does so. See e.g. Silver King 
Coalition Mines Co. v. Conkling !-lining Co., 255 F. 740 (8th 
Cir. 1919). Likewise, one cotenant will not be allowed to de-
feat the interest of his cotenants by purchasing the common 
property at a tax sale. Columbia Trust v. Nielson, 76 Utah 
129, 287 P.926 (1930). However, as stated in Trout v. 
Harrell, 217 Ark. 670, 233 S.l'i.2d 233, 236 (1950): 
the mere relationship of cotenancy does not, ipso 
facto, create a confidential relationship in -ail 
dealings tetween the parties, even though such a 
relationship may exist in some matters. (Under-
scoring in original). 
In short, cotenants, just by reason of their cotenancy, are 
not fiduciaries as to each other with respect to all that they 
do. See, e.g. Britton v. Green, 325 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 
1963); Pure Oil Co. v. Byrnes, 388 Ill. 26, 57 N.E.2d 356 
(1944); 4A Powell on Real Property •605 at 619 (1978). 
Hendrickson v. California Talc Co., 55 Cal. App.2d 279, 
130 P.2d 806 (1943), relied upon by Rio for the proposition 
that the Audrey Respondents owe a fiduciary duty to Rio with 
respect to the exercise of their royalty election solely be-
cause of their status as cotenants with Rio does not stand for 
that proposition. In Hendrickson, a group of persons jointly 
located a mining claim. The location was invalid, however, 
because unbeknown to the group, the land upon which the claim 
was located was part of a larger tract of land which had been 
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temporarily withdrawn from location. The land was subsequent-
ly restored to the public domain and some of the members of 
the original group purported to again locate the claim, but 
did so only for themselves and to the exclusion of the others. 
The court held that the excluded members of the original group 
had an interest in the later claim because the parties had 
agreed jointly to enter upon a common undertaking and thus 
owed fiduciary duties to each other. The decision obviously 
did not and could not rest upon the basis of any cotenancy 
between the parties because the parties never concurrently 
shared the right to possession of a valid claim. 
The fiduciary duty recognized by the Hendrickson case 
arose not from the status of the parties as cotenants but, 
rather, because of their common undertaking in other words, 
because of their agreement with each other. Cotenants clearly 
can contract with one another and, having done so, their 
rights must depend upon the contract. See, e.g. Lichtenberger 
v. Newhouse, 41 Utah 22, 123 P.624 (1924). 
In this case, Rio contracted away any right which it 
might otherwise have had with respect to the election of the 
basis upon which royalties are to be computed under the Audrey 
Lease. It cannot persuasively be argued that the Audrey 
Respondents and Rio contracted for a relationship whereby the 
Audrey Respondents had to exercise the election as fiduciaries 
of Rio. Why expressly deny Rio any voice in the election if 
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Audrey must act for its benefit anyway? There is nothing in 
this contract which suggests Audrey agreed to act for the 
benefit of Rio. Indeed, the language of the agreement sup-
ports the opposite conclusion. 
Rio also relies upon Britton v. Green, 325 F'.2d 377 (10th 
Cir. 1963). This case holds that a cotenant with a right to 
possess the property owes fiduciary duties to its non-posses-
sory cotenants. Reasoning that since such duties are charged 
to the cotenant in possession, Rio argues for application of 
the case to the opposite situation. Here Rio, not the Audrey 
Respondents is in possession of the property. 
The Jimco Respondents, of course, agree with the holdin& 
in E'ritton that a lessee-cotenant, by virtue of the exclusive 
rights of possession necessarily granted to it, ordinarily 
owes fiduciary duties to its cotenants who are not entitled to 
possession of the property. Indeed, the J imco Respondents 
have taken and continue to take the position that Rio owes 
such duties to them. A cotenant in possession, by reason of 
that status, can do many things to the property that will 
waste its value to the cotenant not entitled to possession. 
Because of this fact, when one cotenant has the right to pos-
sess certain property he is often charged by courts with a 
duty to not commit waste and to use the property in a manner 
that will mutually benefit himself and any cotenant not entit-
led to possession. The underlying reasons for this duty do 
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not, however, permit the extension of the duty to cotenants 
who are not entitled to possession. 
A more fundamental flaw in Rio's argument for the ex ten-
sion of the Britton holding to the situation in the instant 
case lies in its failure to appreciate that the prerequisite 
to the existence of the fiduciary duty discussed in the case 
was a writ ten undertaking on the part of one to act primarily 
for the benefit of another. See e.g., First Restatement of 
the Law of Torts § 874, Comment a ( 1939). It was clearly ap-
propriate to recognize such an undertaking or obligation in 
Britton since the leases there expressly so provided. 
It is agreed that seller shall have active charge of 
the operation of said leasehold estate, and that 
said premises shall be operated to the mutual 
interest of all parties hereto as economically as 
good business judgment will warrant. It is further 
agreed that the parties hereto will observe the 
spirit as well as the strict letter of this contract 
and Vlork at all times to the mutual advantage of 
each other in the management and operation and 
development of said lease. 325 F.2d at 381 n.2. 
(Emphasis supplied). 
In contrast, recognition of an undertaking or obligation 
on the part of the Audrey Respondents to exercise their right 
to determine the basis upon which royalties are to be paid 
under the Audrey Lease in the best interests of Rio would be 
totally at odds with the purpose for and intent of Paragraph 
21.3 of the Audrey Lease which expressly vests the royalty 
election solely in the Audrey Respondents and excludes Rio 
from any say in that election. 
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The facts of the instant case as they bear upon the ques-
tion of fiduciary duty are more akin to Twentieth Century-Fox 
Film Corp. v. Teas, 286 F.2d 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 818 (1961) than they are to Britton. There, the de fen-
dants agreed to pay the plaintiff an 8-1/3% royalty on oil and 
gas produced from certain lots acquired from the plaintiff and 
50% of the bonuses paid to them in consideration for leasing 
the same. The lots were leased to third parties who paid an 
8-1/3% royalty directly to the plaintiff and who paid to the 
defendants an additional 11-2/3% royalty together with a 
"variable participating royalty." The primary issue was 
whether these additional "royalty" payments to the defendants, 
or a portion thereof, were actually "bonuses" to which the 
plaintiff was entitled. The court considered and rejected the 
plaintiff's contention that the defendants had a fiduciary 
duty to bargain for the apportionment of royalty and bonus in 
the best interests of the plaintiff, stating: 
The language of the contract so clearly distin-
guishes royalty from any other kind of benefits to 
be realized from a lease of the minerals, we con-
clude that it is clear that there could be no viola-
tion of the defendant's alleged [quasi-fiduciary] 
duty to act in good faith if it was able, as happen-
ed here, to exact an additional amount clearly 
recognized to be royalties. 
286 F.2d at 375. 
Here as in Teas the governing provisions of the parties' 
agreement afford no basis for the recognition of a fiduciary 
duty. 
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IV. 
THE AUDREY RESPONDENTS, IN ENTERING INTO THE 
JIMCO-AUDREY SETTLEMENT STIPULATION, BREACHED NO 
IMPLIED COVENANT IN FAVOR OF RIO AS A MATTER 
OF LAW. 
Rio's final argument going to the merits of the trial 
court's approval of the Jirnco-Audrey Settlement Stipulation is 
that the Audrey Respondents, in entering into that agreement, 
breached certain implied covenants in favor of Rio -- speci-
fically implied covenants to make its election of the basis 
upon which royalties are to be paid under the Audrey Lease in 
the best interests of both itself and Rio and to act in good 
faith. (Brief of App. at 27-31). In support of its argument, 
Rio relies heavily on its prior argument with respect to fid-
uciary duty.§_/ It should be readily apparent that this 
argument is but an attempt to advance under a new guise Rio's 
earlier argument that the Audrey Respondents breached fidu-
ciary duties owed to Rio by entering into the settlement with 
the Jimco Respondents. This argument fails for basically the 
same reasons as the previous one. 
"To imply a negative covenant in any written agreement 
normally requires that the court 'rewrite' the parties' agree-
ment." So Good Potatoe Chip Co. v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 462 F.2d 
61 For example, Rio discusses at length Webster v. Knop, 
6 Utah 2d 273, 312 P.2d 557 (1957), which is essentially in-
distinguishable from Hendrickson v. California Talc Co., 
supra. See the discussion, supra, at 28-29. 
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239, 241 (8th Cir. 1972). Accordingly, " [ i ]mplied covenants 
are not favored in the law." Fraser Sweatman, Inc. v. 
Schreiber, 291 F. Supp. 276, 281 (E.D. Pa. 1968). As this 
court noted in Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain 
Theatres, Inc., 560 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1977): 
An implied covenant must rest entirely on the pre-
sumed intention of the parties as gathered from the 
terms as actually expressed in the written instru-
ment itself, and it must appear that it was so 
clearly within the contemplation of the parties that 
they deemed it unnecessary to express it, and there-
fore omitted to do so; or it must appear that it is 
necessary to infer such a covenant in order to 
effectuate the full purpose of the contract as a 
whole 25 gat~.ered from the written instrument. It 
is not er.ough to say that an implied covenant is 
necessary in order to make the contract fair, or 
that without such a covenant it would be improvident 
or unwise, or that the contract would operate un-
justly. It must arise from the presumed intention 
of the parties as gathered from the instrument as a 
whole. 
An express 
eludes the 
different 
omitted). 
covenant on a given subject matter ex-
possibility of an implie<7 1covenant of a or contradictory nature.- (Citations 
Moreover, "caution must be exercised when an implication of a 
• term would result in a breach." Smith v. Long, 478 P.2d 
232 (Colo. App. 1978). 
The Audrey Lease expressly provides that the Audrey 
]_I See also Williams v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 
331, 424 P.2d 541 (1967); Duvanel v. SlnclaH Ref. 
Kan. 483, 277 P.2d 88 (1951); Masciotra v. Harlan, 
App.2d 376, 233 P.2d 586 (1951). 
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Respondents shall have the sole right to determine the basis 
upon which royal ties under the Lease are to be paid. That 
right could not have been more clearly denied to Rio. To 
recognize the implied covenants for which Rio contends would 
be directly contrary to the evident purpose of the parties in 
so providing. Rio's contention in this regard must, there-
fore, be rejected. 
The Audrey Respondents have not acted in bad faith. Rio 
receives the same share of the Audrey royalties as it would 
have done if the Audrey Respondents had not entered into the 
Settlement Stipulation. The Audrey Respondents waived their 
right of election, not to injure Rio, but to effect what they 
deemed to be a reasonable settlement of this lawsuit. Rio has 
no claim to any of the consideration paid for a settlement 
agreement in which it did not participate. 
v. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DISMISSING RIO'S AMENDED 
COMPLAINT BASED UPON THE JIMCO-AUDREY SETTLEMENT 
STIPULATION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Rio's final argument is that the trial court erred in 
dismissing its Amended Complaint, which alleged various causes 
of action claimed to arise by reason of the Jimco-Audrey 
Settlement Stipulation. The argument requires no extended 
discussion. 
The trial court's action was based upon its earlier ap-
proval of the Settlement Stipulation. Rio's attacks upon that 
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agreement were fully briefed and argued by all parties as part 
of the disposition of the Motion to Approve the Settlement. 
The trial court found, as a matter of law, that by entering 
into the settlement agreement, no duty owed Rio was breached 
and, accordingly, approved the Settlement Stipulation. In as-
much as the trial court found no violation of law occurred by 
the signing of the Stipulation, its dismissal of Rio's Amended 
Complaint which asserted causes of action based upon the sign-
ing of that d:~u~e~t. was proper. 
CONCLUSION 
The Jimco-Audrey Settlement Stipulation is a valid set-
tlement of the disputes in this lawsuit as to the Audrey 
Respondents. Rio has no cause of action as a result of that 
settlement and no right to interfere with it. The Order of 
the trial court should be affirmed in all respects. 
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of April, 1979. 
CLJ-0U~~ 
Clinton D. Vernon lt 
415 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Telephone: (801) 355-5033 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & 
McCARTHY 
Clifford L. Ashton 
E. Scott Savage 
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